[Cryptography] 2008 revision of Bitcoin whitepaper

[Natanael]

Den 26 jan 2015 17:59 skrev "StealthMonger" <StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net>:
>
> In an unsigned message it is written:
>
> > On Jan 24, 2015, at 2:48 PM, StealthMonger <StealthMonger at nym.mixmin.net>
wrote:
> >> It's 183697 bytes and doesn't compress very much, so it won't fit in
one
> >> mixmaster mail message.  I'm an untraceable pseudonym.  How could I get
> >> it to you without becoming traceable?  I have played file split games
> >> for large files and could look up my notes on how to do that.  Are you
> >> up for that?
>
> > Why not Pastebin?
>
> How could it be uploaded to Pastebin anonymously?  Posting to the web
> cannot be done anonymously [1].
>
> Several other writers have also suggested, on-list and off, various
> schemes for uploading this file, including Tor, mega.co.nz, Pastebin,
> and owncloud.rg.net.  They all have in common a low-latency connection
> for the upload.  (PLEASE CORRECT!)  This posting is meant to reply to
> all of these suggestions, to save time for all concerned.
>
> Tor is not anonymous [2,3,4].  No low-latency, connection-based protocol
> can be anonymous: On the assumption that a resourceful adversary such as
> NSA collects IP packet addresses, times, and sizes from key points on
> the Internet, end-point IP packet timing can be correlated to connect
> source and destination, ruining anonymity.
>
> The only way I know to stay anonymous is to use chains of anonymizing
> remailers having deliberately long, random latency and traffic mixing.
> With store-and-forward, the security is in the message, not the
> connection.

I2P with Bote mail, using the random delay option for relay and multiple
relays.

So you've got two layers of tracking resistance, one that behaves similar
to Tor and one on top where I2P nodes running Bote participates in a DHT
for storing and delivering messages. End-to-end encryption in every layer.
Given the mixing of traffic from multiple sources at every level and with
the packet switching behavior, the room for traffic analysis is extremely
limited.
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