[Cryptography] The world's most secure TRNG

[Bill Frantz]

On 9/30/14 at 12:28 AM, pg at futureware.at (Philipp Gühring) wrote:

>>However, because most devs won't understand the above argument, if you
>>actually supply an unwhitened RNG then geeks will look at it and decide
>>that because they see certain biases in it then it must be broken!  And
>>broken they will call it.  And broken will be your sales.
>
>Yes!
>
>>So from a marketing point of view you should put a whitener on the
>>part.
>
>Yes!
>
>But when you do that, (like Intel did with their RdRand), people will
>accuse you of providing malicious randomness that they can´t audit
>anymore, since you whitened it.
>
>Has anyone found a solution to that paradox yet?

Educate the devs. Include in the instructions for each device 
the following:

"This device, like all hardware random number sources, does not 
produce completely random bits. If completely random bits are 
needed a "whitening" operation will be needed. (references). If 
is is being used to seed a pseudo random number generator, use 
XX% more bits than you would use from a perfect source.

"This device does not whiten its output in order to allow users 
to more easily test the quality of the random bits it produces."

Cheers - Bill

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