[Cryptography] Fork of TrueCrypt
Niklas Lemcke - 林樂寬
compul at coletteral.net
Thu Jun 5 11:23:52 EDT 2014
On Wed, 4 Jun 2014 19:10:21 -0400
Bill Cox <waywardgeek at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 4, 2014 at 5:53 PM, Jerry Leichter <leichter at lrw.com> wrote:
>
> > On Jun 3, 2014, at 7:05 AM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek at gmail.com> wrote:
> > > An auto-update feature pinging the server would alert any network
> > snooper of exactly who was using the TrueCrypt fork. From a security point
> > of view, auto-update is DOA.
> > On the other hand, regularly checking a public location on which the
> > latest versions of a wide variety of products are listed reveals pretty
> > much nothing.;
> >
> > If you act on what you find and go looking for the new version, of course,
> > you reveal your interest. But that's true *no matter how you check for or
> > download new versions*: The metadata about where you connect reveals your
> > interests. Shock, horror. Tor.
> > -- Jerry
> >
> >
> All true. It's funny, but I can argue that BitLocker is safer in some ways
> because your computer is *expected* to contact Microsoft once a day.
>
> So, what if people just go with BitLocker? It probably is secure against
> most government snooping, just not ours. At what point do we trust our
> government not to illegally snoop and do horrific Star-Chamber sorts of
> harm?
It's not my government, and I don't trust it. I don't trust anyone,
especially governments or other monetary organisations.
*puts on tinfoil hat*
>
> Bill
--
Niklas Lemcke - 林樂寬
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