[Cryptography] GHCQ Penetration of Belgacom

[Guido Witmond]

On 12/22/14 15:54, ianG wrote:

> When I was young enough to be a uni student there was a lot of research
> into hardware reliability and the notion of having alternate hardware
> implementations vote on results.  I though it all a bit of a woftam, but
> I wonder to what extent this research was encouraged by the knowledge
> that these sorts of attacks could be practical threats?

I remember a story that early time computers were so unreliable that
programmers did a multiplication directly after a division to verify the
result.

Voting on results is a common technique in aircraft and other
environments with low tolerance to failure due to wear, electrical
glitches, cosmic radiation, etc.

Crypto could be seen as low tolerance to failure. However, verification
appears to be impossible: proof that there is no leak of key material...


Regards, Guido.

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 836 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: <http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/attachments/20141223/d2582d9e/attachment.sig>