[Cryptography] Passwords are dying - get over it

[Lars Luthman]

On Mon, 2013-12-23 at 10:10 -0500, Bill Cox wrote: 
> The bad news: even the 0.1% of us who bother to add key stretching to our
> ssh private key's only get 2048 rounds of AES-256, which wont even slow
> down an ASIC based cracker.  All this does is provide security against
> hackers with graphics cards, and not much security at that.  Frankly, this
> protection is so dismal, I give up.  Whoever is influencing TrueCrypt and
> OpenSSL into hard-coding 2048 worthless rounds of key stretching designed
> to be efficient on ASICs wins.

But how much key stretching do you want? Even with a billion rounds you
don't add more than ~30 bits of work, which is less than what you get by
adding three more words to a Diceware-like passphrase using a dictionary
with 2000 words.


--ll
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