non 2048-bit keys

[Samuel Neves]

If an attacker creating a special-purpose machine to break your keys is
a realistic scenario, why are you even considering keys of that size?

Best regards,
Samuel Neves

On 15-08-2010 04:25, John Gilmore wrote:
>>>                                      ... 2048-bit keys performing
>>> at 1/9th of 1024-bit. My own internal benchmarks have been closer to
>>> 1/7th to 1/8th. Either way, that's back in line with the above stated
>>> 90-95% overhead. Meaning, in Dan's words "2048 ain't happening."
> Can I abuse a phrase and call this "binary thinking"?
>
> There is no reason that the next step after 1024 bits has to be 2048 bits.
> How about 1032 bits?  Or 1040?  Or 1104?
> How about 1200 bits?  How about 1536?  How about 1600?  1808?
>
> I have a theory that if everyone picked a pseudo-random key size above
> 1024 and below 2048, rather than standardizing on Yet Another Fixed
> Keysize, we'd avoid making a powerful incentive for bad guys to build
> a key-cracker optimized for one size.  Which incentive we have
> currently created at 1024 bits.  It's the Microsoft Windows of key
> sizes -- the target that gets you 90+% of the market.  So pick a
> larger size than 1024 that your server load can live with, even if it
> isn't 2048.  And don't tell anybody else what size you picked :-).
>
> 	John
>
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