combining entropy
IanG
iang at systemics.com
Sat Oct 25 07:40:16 EDT 2008
Jonathan Katz wrote:
> I think it depends on what you mean by "N pools of entropy".
I can see that my description was a bit weak, yes. Here's a better
view, incorporating the feedback:
If I have N people, each with a single pool of entropy,
and I pool each of their contributions together with XOR,
is that as good as it gets?
My assumptions are:
* I trust no single person and their source of entropy.
* I trust at least one person + pool.
* Entropy by its definition is independent and is private
(but it is worth stating these, as any leaks will kill us!)
* Efficiency is not a concern, we just expand the pool size
(each pool is size X, and the result is size X).
* The people have ordinary skill.
now to respond to the questions:
1. I am assuming that at least one pool is good entropy. This is
partly an assumption of desperation or simplicity.
In practice, no individual (source or person) is trusted at an
isolated level. But this leads to a sort of circular argument that
says, nobody is trusted. We can solve this two ways:
I join the circle. I trust myself, *but* I don't trust
my source of entropy. So this is still hopeful.
We ensure that there are at least two cartels in the
circle that don't trust each other! Then, add a dash
of game theory, and the two cartel pools should at
least be independent of each other, and therefore the
result should be good entropy.
I suspect others could more logically arrive at a better assumption,
but for now, the assumption of one trusted person/pool seems to
cover it.
2. Having thought about Stephan's comment a bit more (because it
arrived first), and a bit more about John D's entropy comments
(because they were precise), it is clear that I need to stress the
privacy / independence criteria, even if strictly covered by the
definition of entropy. Too much of the practical aspects will
depend on ensuring independence of the pools to just lean blithely
on the definitions. I had missed that dependency.
3. The proposals on concatenation and cleanup are tempting. In
Jon's words, it can solve obvious problems. However, they introduce
a complexity of understanding the cleanup function, and potential
for failures. Jack's tradeoffs. This has made me realise the last
assumption, now added:
The people have ordinary skill.
Which means they are unable to determine whether a cryptographically
complex cleanup function is indeed cleaning, or not.
Here, then, we reach an obvious limit, in that the people have to be
able to determine that the XOR is doing its job, and they need to be
able to do a bit of research to decide what is their best guess at
their private entropy source.
Thanks to all.
iang
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