OpenSparc -- the open source chip (except for the crypto parts)

[Scott Guthery]

>>> but also a proof that the source code one has is the source of the
implementation.

This is an unsolved problem for code in tamper-resistant devices.  There are
precious few procedures to, for example, determine that the CAC card that
was issued to Pfc. Sally Green this morning bears any relationship
whatsoever to the code that went through FIPS certification. (A hash of the
code is meaningless since the card will simply burp up the right answer.)  I
have seen one such procedure but I have never seen any such procedure
implemented in real cards.

And to Marcos' point, not only do certification labs not look for backdoors
but I once had an employee of such a lab tell me that even if they found one
the are not obliged to enter this in their report unless, of course, they
had been explicitly requested to test for the absence of backdoors.  In that
regard, I have never seen a security profile that contained a claim of no
backdoors.  And I guess you know who is paying big bucks for the
certification report. 

Smart cards from F.  TPMs from C.  A 'sleep at the wheel.

Cheers, Scott

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