The PKC-only application security model ...
Anne & Lynn Wheeler
lynn at garlic.com
Wed Jul 23 17:21:37 EDT 2008
Thierry Moreau wrote:
> A) The big picture refers to the "PKC-only application security
> scheme", in which client-server applications may be secured with
> client-side public key pairs, but *no trusted certification authority*
> is involved (server operators are expected to maintain a trusted
> database of their clients' public keys).
original PK-init (public key) draft for Kerberos was (only)
certificateless public key operation ...
i.e. kerberos server operators maintaining trusted database of their
clients' public keys (in
lieu of passwords) ... PKI/certificate mode of operation was eventually
added to the specification.
lots of past posts about certificateless public key kerberos
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#kerberos
similar implementation was done for RADIUS
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#radius
general posts about certificateless (sometimes "naked") public key
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#certless
X9.59 is financial transaction standard also using certificateless
public key operation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#x959
part of the issue was that in the mid-90s, the x9a10 financial standard
working group
had been given the requirement to preserve the integrity of the
financial infrastructure
for all retail payments. One of the issues for x9.59 was that it had to
be lightweight enough
to operate in existing infrastructures. Some of the certificate-oriented
payment transaction
standards from the period resulted in factor of 100 times (two orders of
magnitude) payload
(i.e. certificate payload overhead could be 100 times larger than basic
payment transaction)
and processing (i.e. certificate processing overhead could be 100 times
larger than basic
payment transaction) bloat
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/subpubkey.html#bloat
general discussions of the "account authority public key" model (as
contrast to
"certification authority public key" model)
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#aads
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