Fixing SSL (was Re: Dutch Transport Card Broken)

Thierry Moreau thierry.moreau at connotech.com
Thu Jan 31 10:08:55 EST 2008



Philipp Gühring wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> 
>>SSL key distribution and management is horribly broken,
>>with the result that everyone winds up using plaintext
>>when they should not.
> 
> 
> Yes, sending client certificates in plaintext while claiming that SSL/TLS is 
> secure doesn´t work in a world of phishing and identity theft anymore.
> 
> We have the paradox situation that I have to tell people that they should use 
> HTTPS with server-certificates and username+password inside the HTTPS 
> session, because that´s more secure than client certificates ...
> 
> Does anyone have an idea how we can fix this flaw within SSL/TLS within a 
> reasonable timeframe, so that it can be implemented and shipped by the 
> vendors in this century?
> 
> (I don´t think that starting from scratch and replacing SSL makes much sense, 
> since it´s just one huge flaw ...)
> 

If I recall correctly, SSL was designed chronologically after ISO OSI 
Network-Layer Security Protocol (yes, the official WAN was actually X.25 
at one point) or Transport Layer Security Protocol, both in their 
connection-oriented flavor, which used ideas originating from DecNET 
designs (researcher names Tardo, Alagappan; I once had a patent number 
in this thread of protocol engineering, but I lost it). Anyway, the key 
point in these visionary ideas is that the D-H exchange occurs *before* 
the exchange of security certificates. This provided the traffic-flow 
confidentiality that becomes desirable to protect privacy these days.

So, you got your fix with OSI NLSP or TLSP, you just have to overcome 
the *power of the installed base*!

Regards,

-- 

- Thierry Moreau

CONNOTECH Experts-conseils inc.
9130 Place de Montgolfier
Montreal, Qc
Canada   H2M 2A1

Tel.: (514)385-5691
Fax:  (514)385-5900

web site: http://www.connotech.com
e-mail: thierry.moreau at connotech.com

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