SSL/TLS and port 587

[Dave Korn]

On 22 January 2008 18:38, Ed Gerck wrote:

> It is misleading to claim that port 587 solves the security problem of
> email eavesdropping, and gives people a false sense of security. It is
> worse than using a 56-bit DES key -- the email is in plaintext where it is
> most vulnerable.   

  Well, yes: it would be misleading to claim that end-to-end security protects
you against an insecure or hostile endpoint.  But it's a truism, and it's not
right to say that there is a security gap that is any part of the remit of
SSL/TLS to alleviate; the insecurity - the untrusted endpoint - is the same
regardless of whether you use end-to-end security or not.

  It's probably also not inaccurate to say that SSL/TLS protects you against
warrantless wiretapping; the warrantless wiretap program is implemented by
mass surveillance of backbone traffic, even AT+T doesn't actually forward the
traffic to their mail servers, decrypt it and then send it back to the tap
point - as far as we know.  When the spooks want your traffic as decrypted by
your ISP server, that's when they *do* go get a warrant, but the broad mass
warrantless wiretapping program is just that, and it'd done by sniffing the
traffic in the middle.  SSL/TLS *does* protect you against that, and the only
time it won't is if you're singled out for investigation.

  This is not to say that it wouldn't be possible for all ISPs to collaborate
with the TLAs to log, sniff or forward the decrypted traffic from their
servers, but if they can't even set up central tapping at a couple of core
transit sites of one ISP without someone spilling the beans, it seems
improbable that every ISP everywhere is sending them copies of all the traffic
from every server...

    cheers,
      DaveK
-- 

Can't think of a witty .sigline today....

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