cold boot attacks on disk encryption

[Perry E. Metzger]

"Ali, Saqib" <docbook.xml at gmail.com> writes:
> i think in most cases tamper-resistant is sufficient - provided the
> device that can detect an attempt of tampering, and erase itself.

Clearly, if the anti-tamper mechanisms work, the device will not be
compromised. The problem is, such mechanisms don't always work. There
is lots of stuff in the literature about various kinds of attacks on
such devices.

Again, I will point out the following from my original comment:

>>  As always, the question is whether what you are protecting is
>>  worth more than the attackers would have to spend on the attack.

Perry

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