cold boot attacks on disk encryption

[Ali, Saqib]

i think in most cases tamper-resistant is sufficient - provided the
device that can detect an attempt of tampering, and erase itself. DRAM
chips referred to in this attack are not tamper-resistant.

http://www.linkedin.com/in/encryption


On Thu, Feb 21, 2008 at 2:59 PM, Perry E. Metzger <perry at piermont.com> wrote:
>
>  "Ali, Saqib" <docbook.xml at gmail.com> writes:
>
> > How about TPM? Would this type of attack work on a tamper-resistant ver1.2 TPM?
>
>  The phrase is "tamper resistant", not "tamper proof". Depending on how
>  determined your attackers are, pretty much anything depending on
>  tamper resistant hardware will fall. As always, the question is
>  whether what you are protecting is worth more than the attackers would
>  have to spend on the attack.
>
>  --
>
>
> Perry E. Metzger                perry at piermont.com
>



-- 
Saqib Ali, CISSP, ISSAP
http://www.full-disk-encryption.net

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