TPM, part 2

Anne & Lynn Wheeler lynn at garlic.com
Sun Jul 1 21:53:40 EDT 2007


Peter Gutmann wrote:
> I have a friend who implemented a basic trusted-boot mechanism for a student
> project, so we have evidence of at least one use of a TPM for TC, and I know
> some folks at IBM Research were playing with one a few years ago, so that's at
> least two users so far.  Anyone else?

as i've mentioned before ... we looked at somewhat similar hardware solution
(but much simpler) for the original acorn (ibm/pc code name), primarily as software piracy 
countermeasure  ... but the tamper resistant technology state of the art at the time was 
way too expensive ... and investigation was dropped. what was seen during
the 80s were things like those specially encoded floppy disks ... that had 
to be inserted when you started the application ... a couple past posts/references:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2006p.html#41 Device Authentication - The answer to attacks lauched using stolen passwords?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm27.htm#9 Enterprise Right Management vs. Traditional Encryption Tools
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2007m.html#20 Patents, Copyrights, Profits, Flex and Hercules

in the late 90s i would periodically chide the TPM folks about what
they were doing ... and at an assurance talk i gave in the trusted computing
track at intel developers forum (spring 2001), i chided the guy running
the effort (was sitting in the front row) that it was nice to see that 
over the previous couple yrs that TPM had started to look more & more
like the AADS chip strawman. his retort was something about it being
because I didn't have a committee of couple hundred people helping
me with (my) chip design. 

misc. past posts mentioning aads chip strawman
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/x959.html#aads

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