a new way to build quantum computers?

Jon Callas jon at callas.org
Sat Aug 18 21:00:33 EDT 2007


Via Farber's list:

From: Rod Van Meter <rdv at sfc.wide.ad.jp>
Date: August 18, 2007 11:39:47 AM EDT
To: dave at farber.net
Subject: Re: [IP] Light pulses crack security codes within seconds

http://www.tgdaily.com/content/view/33425/118/

Wow, that's one of the most egregious quantum computing-related
articles I've ever seen.  I'm not even sure where to start.

First off, let's point at the real research paper:
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/317/5840/929
Coherent Optical Spectroscopy of a Strongly Driven Quantum Dot
Xiaodong Xu, Bo Sun, Paul R. Berman, Duncan G. Steel, Allan
S. Bracker, Dan Gammon, L. J. Sham

I read it.  It's an advance, but does not yet mean anything at all is
practical.  Their work is on the optical properties of self-assembled
quantum dots.  There are two major categories of quantum dots in
semiconductors, self-assembled and lithographically created (and
within each of those, many types).  The self-assembled dots are a
compound grown on top of a substrate of a different kind.  Differences
in the crystalline structure mean that the deposited material "beads
up", like water on a freshly-waxed car.  The quantum dot itself then
is a place where the motion of electrons can be confined to a small
two-dimensional area at the interface between the materials, creating
a place where quantum wave functions can behave like an "artificial
atom".

The work presented in the paper is some of the first solid
experimental work on the optical properties of self-assembled dots
that I have seen, though I'm not an expert.  Various groups, including
that of my adviser, Kohei M. Itoh (
http://www.appi.keio.ac.jp/Itoh_group/ ), have been working for years
on the growth and mechanical characteristics (stress/strain, size and
shape, etc.) of self-assembled dots.  All of that has been very hard
work, and as far as I know no one has a reliable way to grow the dots
in a given place.  I wish they had a micrograph of the device, I'd
like to see it.

But the TG article talks only a little about the research itself; it's
mostly breathless pie-in-the-sky reporting on the possibilities of
quantum computers.

"Light pulses crack security codes within seconds," the title reads.
Wow.  Well, first off, it can't be done yet, and won't be done for
years, despite the present tense.  Second, saying it's done with light
pulses is like saying we compute today with electrons.  It's true, but
tells you nothing about transistors or computer architecture.  Third,
"crack security codes" is as vague and non-technical as it gets, not
to mention outright wrong (we'll come back to that).  Fourth, "within
seconds" presumes many things about a quantum computer that are not
yet defined to any level of precision.  This topic is the focus of my
research: how do you build a large-scale quantum computer out of a
given technology?  No one really knows yet.

Which security codes does a paper on the spectroscopy of a quantum
dot break?  Well, none, really.  But where they're headed with that is
obviously Shor's algorithm for factoring large numbers on a quantum
computer.  If the algorithm can be efficiently implemented, it is
theoretically capable of breaking RSA public-key cryptography and
elliptic curve crypto.

HOWEVER, the advantage may well be with the defenders on this one.
Shor turns a super-polynomial problem (factoring) into a polynomial
one.  Not coincidentally, the complexity of running Shor is similar to
the complexity of doing the encryption in the first place.  And
running an algorithm of the same computational class on a quantum
machine will probably always be harder than running an algorithm on a
classical computer.  So, raise your key length and you might be okay.

Shor does nothing to affect symmetric key cryptography, or any system
not dependent on the factoring problem.

I hesitate to mention this, for fear it will be misinterpreted, but in
my opinion there is still some small doubt about whether Shor can in
practice be scaled to large sizes, on theoretical grounds, let alone
the practical difficulties of building using any given technology.
The problem is the quantum Fourier transform (QFT) that is the key to
Shor requires, in the abstract, exponentially precise gates as the
problem size grows.  Most researchers believe that the QFT can be
truncated at some reasonable level and will still have a high
probability of success.  However, the several papers on the topic
(including one by a collaborator of mine) in the last decade have
taken different approaches to the calculation, and come up with
substantially different answers, making different assumptions about
the problem.  The theorists seem confident, but I will give only
provisional assent until I see it implemented.  Perhaps I'm just not
smart enough to fully grasp the arguments in the papers.

Breaking a code in seconds really depends on both the problem and the
machine.  A major factor is how many levels of quantum error
correction (QEC) are necessary, which is directly dependent on the
quality of the physical implementation.  QEC is a major topic of
research; USC is even sponsoring a conference on the topic in December
( http://qserver.usc.edu/qec07/ ).

Physical and logical clock speed, as well as the amount of parallelism
in the system, determine how long it will take to run the algorithm on
a particular problem, of course.  This fact has gotten too little
attention from both the experimentalists and the theorists, in my
opinion.  See http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0507023 .

Enough for now.  I can talk about this topic all day, including what
the boundaries of my knowledge are; take everything I say with a grain
of salt.

        	   --Rod


-- 
Rodney Van Meter
Assistant Professor of Environment and Information Studies
Keio University, Shonan Fujisawa Campus, Japan
http://web.sfc.keio.ac.jp/~rdv/

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