New DoD encryption mandate

Alex Alten alex at alten.org
Fri Aug 17 20:21:16 EDT 2007


At 04:02 AM 8/17/2007 -0700, =?UTF-8?Q?Ivan_Krsti=C4=87?= wrote:
>On Aug 16, 2007, at 8:30 AM, Ali, Saqib wrote:
>>The other problem is that it lacks any centralized management. If you
>>are letting TPM manage your Bitlocker keys you still need a TPM
>>management suite with key backup/restore/transfer/migrate capabilities
>>in case your computer goes bad.
>
>How so? If your computer goes bad, you need a *backup*. That's
>entirely orthogonal to the drive encryption problem. Bitlocker uses
>the TPM to provide assurance that your drive -- really, volume -- is
>locked to your computer, and that the early boot environment hasn't
>been messed with. When either check fails, you use the BitLocker
>recovery password (either on a USB stick or entered manually) to
>recover your data. This holds in the event that you take your drive
>out and stick it in a different machine. In other words, the TPM is
>not a single point of failure, so I don't understand why you think
>you care about TPM backup/restore/transfer.

It depends on your requirements.  For a large numbers of computers
owned by a corporation/organization centralized key management
makes a lot of sense.  For a single user with a privately purchased
computer then the recovery password makes more sense.

>>The third problem is that it is software based encryption, which uses
>>the main CPU to perform the encryption.
>
>Security is never free, but in 2007, we can afford the cycles. What's
>a better use for them? Drawing semi-transparent stained glass window
>borders?

Agreed, for most requirements.  Sometimes one may need to keep keys
in trusted hardware only.  The only real fly-in-the-ointment is that current
hash algorithms (SHA-1, SHA-2, etc.) don't scale across multiple CPU
cores (assuming you need integrity along with your privacy).

- Alex

--

Alex Alten
alex at alten.org



---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at metzdowd.com



More information about the cryptography mailing list