PayPad

leichter_jerrold at emc.com leichter_jerrold at emc.com
Wed Mar 22 15:32:44 EST 2006


PayPad (www.paypad.com) is an initiative that seems to have JPMorganChase
Chase behind it to provide an alternative method for paying transactions
on line.  You buy a PayPad device, a small card reader with integrated
keypad.  It connects to your PC using USB.  To pay using PayPad at
a merchant that supports it, you select that as an option, swipe your
card, enter your PIN, and the data is (allegedly) sent encrypted
from the PayPad device direct to the merchant.

Advantage to the merchant:  It's a debit card transaction, and they
claim the transaction fees are half those of a credit card. Of course,
the consumer pays for everything:  The device itself (about $60), the
lack of "float".  It's not clear what kind of recourse you might have
in case of fraud.

It's sold as "the secure alternative to using your credit card
online".  Unfortunately, it has the problems long discussed on
this list:  The PayPad itself has no display.  It authorizes a
transaction the details of which are on your computer screen.
You have only the software's word for it that there is any
connection between what's on the screen and what's sent to the
merchant (or to someone else entirely).

Realistically, it's hard to see how this is any more secure than
a standard credit card transaction in an SSL session.  It's not
even clear that the card data is encrypted in the device - for
all we know, card data and pin are transfered over the USB to the
application you have to run on your PC, ready to be stolen by,
say, a targetted virus.  They do claim that you are protected in
another way:  "Your sensitive data never goes to the merchant or
into a database that can be hacked .... The encrypted transaction
is handled directly with your bank...."  (I guess banks don't
keep databases....)

Anyone know anything more about this effort?

 							-- Jerry


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