long-term GPG signing key

[Perry E. Metzger]

Ian G <iang at systemics.com> writes:
> Travis H. wrote:
>> I'd like to make a long-term key for signing communication keys using
>> GPG and I'm wondering what the current recommendation is for such.  I
>> remember a problem with Elgamal signing keys and I'm under the
>> impression that the 1024 bit strength provided by p in the DSA is not
>> sufficiently strong when compared to my encryption keys, which are
>> typically at least 4096-bit D/H, which I typically use for a year.
>
> 1. Signing keys face a different set of
> non-crypto threats than to encryption
> keys.  In practice, the attack envelope
> is much smaller, less likely.

I call "bull".

You have no idea what his usage pattern is like, and you have no idea
what the consequences for him of a forged signature key might be. It
is therefore unreasonable -- indeed, unprofessional -- to make such
claims off the cuff.

-- 
Perry E. Metzger		perry at piermont.com

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