Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 (fwd)

Alexander Klimov alserkli at
Wed Oct 5 16:52:44 EDT 2005

On Sun, 2 Oct 2005, Matt Crawford wrote:
> On Sep 29, 2005, at 18:32, Jason Holt wrote:
> > Of course, you can put anything you want in the cert, since the
> > servers know that my CA only certifies 1 bit of data about users
> > (namely, that they only get one cert per scarce resource).
> "One per person" is a tough thing to do purely over the internet.  IP
> addresses get NATted or reassigned dynamically.  Email addresses are
> free in infinite quantity.  Any system that levels penalties on nyms
> for bad actions is playing whack-a-mole.  A system in which nyms
> accumulate {fame, credit, privilege} for good actions still has a
> hope ... as long as those credits can't be granted by an army of
> extra nyms of the same person.

Since the problem we are trying to solve is to prevent '''automated''' [1]
vandalism, I guess the only solution is to use some Turing-test
system, for example, recognition of the number on an image. In fact,
this test only needed on the user registration form and for edit by
non-registered user.

The problem with any other more complex system (even if it works) is
that it prevents new users from becoming editors and thus it is

[1]  I guess, that non-automated vandalism is not a big problem since
     the number of watchers is higher than the number of vandals (otherwise,
     something is wrong with the system :-) and reverting to the previous
     content is not time-consuming.


The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo at

More information about the cryptography mailing list