THE SIXTH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (EC-05)
Linda Casals
lindac at dimacs.rutgers.edu
Tue May 10 13:52:59 EDT 2005
This message is being forwarded to you on behalf of
Joan Feigenbaum, Yale University, DIMACS Member
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THE SIXTH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (EC-05)
Registration now Open!
See Accepted Papers, Workshops, Tutorials, below.
June 5-8, 2005, Vancouver, Canada
http://www.acm.org/ec05
Registration is now open for ACM EC-05! Early registration ends May
16th, so sign up now at:
http://www.acm.org/sigs/sigecom/ec05/registrations.shtml
Since 1999 the ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce
(SIGECOM) has sponsored the leading scientific conference on advances
in theory, systems, and applications for electronic commerce. Below
is the schedule for the 4 tutorials, 1 workshop, and 32 papers
accepted for ACM EC-05. For additional information, please visit:
http://www.acm.org/ec05.
This year, ACM EC-05 will be held from Sunday, June 5 through
Wednesday, June 8, 2005 at the Vancouver Marriott Pinnacle resort, a
first-class hotel located downtown in the stunning city of Vancouver,
Canada. For more information about the conference surroundings, visit
Vancouver's tourism Web site:
http://www.tourismvancouver.com
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Tutorials
http://www.acm.org/sigs/sigecom/ec05/tutorials.shtml
Sun, Jun 5, 2005 - Morning
1) Optimal Mechanism Design without Priors - Jason Hartline
2) Trading Agent Design and Analysis - Michael P. Wellman
Sun, Jun 5, 2005 - Afternoon (two one-hour talks)
1) Polynomial Time Algorithms for Market Equilibria
- Kamal Jain and Vijay Vazirani
2) Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges
- Tuomas Sandholm
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Workshop
http://research.yahoo.com/~pennockd/ext/ssa/
Sun, Jun 5 2005 - All Day
Workshop on Sponsored Search Auctions - David Pennock and Kursad Asdemir
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Final program
MONDAY
08:30 - 10:10 Ranking Systems: The PageRank Axioms
Alon Altman, Moshe Tennenholtz
Weak monotonicity suffices for truthfulness on convex domains
Michael Saks, Lan Yu
Marginal Contribution Nets: A Compact Representation Scheme for
Coalitional Games
Samuel Ieong, Yoav Shoham
Cost Sharing in a Job Scheduling Problem Using the Shapley Value
Debasis Mishra, Bharath Rangarajan
10:10 - 10:40 BREAK
10:40 - 12:20 Interconnected Communication Networks Provisioned
Selfishly
Pedro Ferreira, Marvin Sirbu
Hidden-Action in Multi-Hop Routing
Michal Feldman, John Chuang, Ion Stoica, Scott Shenker
Content Availability, Pollution and Poisoning in Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing Networks
Nicolas Christin, Andreas Weigend, John Chuang
A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for Distributed
Shared Clusters
Michal Feldman, Kevin Lai, Li Zhang
12:20 - 02:00 LUNCH
02:00 - 03:00 Invited Speaker: Ehud Kalai, Northwestern University
03:00 - 03:30 BREAK
03:30 - 05:10 Nearly Optimal Multi Attribute Auctions
Amir Ronen, Daniel Lehmann
Optimal Design of English Auctions with Discrete bid Levels
Esther David, Alex Rogers, Nicholas Jennings, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kraus
Robust Solutions for Combinatorial Auctions
Alan Holland, Barry O'Sullivan
Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Mohammad Mahdian, David Parkes
TUESDAY
08:30 - 10:10 First-Price Path Auctions
Nicole Immorlica, David Karger, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami
From Optimal Limited to Unlimited Supply Auctions
Robert McGrew, Jason Hartline
True Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard To Measure: Edge Deletion and VCG
Payments in Graphs
Edith Elkind
Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders
Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, Amin Saberi
10:10 - 10:40 BREAK
10:40 - 12:20 Graceful Service Degradation (or, How to Know your
Payment is Late)
Alexandr Andoni, Jessica Staddon
Privacy-Preserving Credit Checking
Keith Frikken, Mikhail Atallah, Chen Zhang
Dynamic and Secure B2B E-contract Update Management
Samuil Angelov, Sven Till, Paul Grefen
Secure Distributed Human Computation
Craig Gentry, Zulfikar Ramzan, Stuart Stubblebine
12:20 - 02:00 LUNCH
02:00 - 03:00 Invited Talk: Jennifer Rexford, Princeton University
03:00 - 03:30 BREAK
03:30 - 05:10 Communication Complexity of Common Voting Protocols
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions: Demand Queries and
Ascending Auctions
Liad Blumrosen, Noam Nisan
Fairness and Optimality in Congestion Games
Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Viswanath Nagarajan, Vijay Vazirani
Congestion Games with Failures
Maria Polukarov, Michal Penn, Moshe Tennenholtz
WEDNESDAY
08:30 - 10:10 ICE: An Iterative Combinatorial Exchange
David Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Adam Juda,
Sebastien Lahaie, Benjamin Lubin, Loizos Michael, Jeffrey Shneidman, Hassan Sultan
Self-Selection, Salvaging, Slacking, and Stoning: the Impacts of
Negative Feedback at eBay
Tapan Khopkar, Xin Li, Paul Resnick
Information Markets vs. Opinion Pools: An Empirical Comparison
Yiling Chen, Chao-Hsien Chu, Tracy Mullen, David Pennock
Integrating Tradeoff Support in Product Search Tools for E-Commerce
Sites
Pearl Pu, Li Chen
10:10 - 10:40 BREAK
10:40 - 11:55 Complexity of (Iterated) Dominance
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Partially
Informed Environments
Ahuva Mu'alem
Towards Truthful Mechanisms for Binary Demand Games: A General
Framework
MingYang Kao, XiangYang Li, WeiZhao Wang
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