Who's afraid of Mallory Wolf?
Ian Grigg
iang at systemics.com
Wed Mar 26 01:34:07 EST 2003
On Tuesday 25 March 2003 15:22, Bill Stewart wrote:
> I get the impression that we're talking at cross-purposes here,
> with at least two different discussions.
Yep. I haven't counted them up yet, but
the full discussion includes at least 6
disparate threads. The challenge is to
not arbitrarily switch from one thread to
another without losing the context of the
first.
The way I got where (I think) I am is this:
Fact: The SSL cert that is required for
the server is expensive.
Question: Why do we have to pay that
expense, and what happens if we use a
self-signed cert?
Answer: "the MITM!" "Spoofing!"
OK, so now let's challenge the assumptions:
Question: What is the MITM?
And why should we care?
And, when we've answered that question,
let's plug that truth back into the 1st
question. (And, the same for spoofing.)
> Let's look at several cases:
>
> 1 - Sites that have SSL and Expensive Certs that need them and need MITM
> protection
> 1a - These sites, but with other security holes making it easy to break in.
> 1b - These sites, broken by SSL bugs or browser bugs
> 2 - Sites that have SSL and Expensive Certs that don't need them,
> as long as they've got some crypto like self-signed certs,
> which don't give MITM protection
> 3 - Sites that don't have SSL today because it's too annoying,
> for which crypto would be useful,
> and ADH or self-signed certs would be good enough,
> because MITM isn't a big threat for them.
> 4 - Sites that don't need crypto.
Fantastic! a 2 x 2:
GOT HTTP
SSL+ ONLY
cert
Want
Crypto 1
Want (may have bugs)
certs
Want 2 3
Crypto
(adh/ssc)
Don't 4
want
Crypto
Totals: 1% 99%
Hmm, it drew out as a 2 x 3 (only in fixed font).
So, I wonder what the totals on the right would
be? How many people want crypto/MITM, how many
would be happy with crypto/no MITM protection,
and how many don't want any crypto?
--
iang
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