Who's afraid of Mallory Wolf?

[Ed Gerck]

Ben Laurie wrote:

> It seems to me that the difference between PGP's WoT and what you are
> suggesting is that the entity which is attempting to prove the linkage
> between their DN and a private key is that they get to choose which
> signatures the relying party should refer to.

PGP's WoT already does that. To be clear, in PGP the entity that is attempting
to prove the linkage between a DN and a public key chooses which signatures
are acceptable, their "degree of trust", and how these signatures became
acceptable in the first place. BTW, a similar facility also exists in X.509, where
the entity that is attempting to prove the linkage may  accept or reject a CA
for that purpose (unfortunately, browsers make this decision "automatically"
for the user but it does not need to be so).

That said, the paper does not provide a way to implement the method I
suggested. The paper only shows that such a method should exist.

Cheers,
Ed Gerck


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