Scientists question electronic voting

[Trei, Peter]

> Francois Grieu[SMTP:fgrieu at micronet.fr]
> 
> Peter Trei wrote:
> 
> >  I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the polling
> >  station, after the voter has had an opportunity to examine it.
> >  This serves two purposes: First, it prevents the vote selling
> >  described above, and second, if a recount is required, it allows
> >  the recount to be done on the basis of a trustworthy  record,
> >  already certified by the voter as accurate.
> 
> Then there is the problem that the printed receipt must not be usable 
> to determine who voted for who, even knowing in which order the 
> voters went to the machine. Therefore the printed receipts must be 
> shuffled. Which brings us straight back to papers in a box, that we 
> shake before opening.
> 
> Every way I look at it, electronic voting has a hard time to match 
> the resilience to abuse of the traditional 
> bulletin-in-an-enveloppe-in-a-box.
> 
>    Francois Grieu
> 
I absolutely agree. Here in the US, where voters often have to make
over a dozen choices each time they vote, the value of automating
the process is significant. But it *must* be done in a way which
increases voter confidence in the result.

Ballot boxes are also subject to many forms of fraud. But a dual
system  (electronic backed up by paper) is more resistant to
attack then either alone.

Peter



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