Scientists question electronic voting

[Trei, Peter]

> Ian Brown[SMTP:I.Brown at cs.ucl.ac.uk] wrote:
> 
> 
> Ed Gerck wrote:
> > Printing a paper receipt that the voter can see is a proposal 
> > that addresses one of the major weaknesses of electronic 
> > voting. However, it creates problems that are even harder to 
> > solve than the silent subversion of e-records.
> > 
> > For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by 
> > using a small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera, 
> > obtain a copy of that receipt and use it to get money for the 
> > vote, or keep the job. And no one would know or be able to trace it.
> 
> As a voter could record what they did with pencil-and-paper or a
> mechanical voting machine.
> 
> The partial defence in all three systems is that the voter should be
> able to void the vote after photographing a "receipt" to hand over later
> to the vote-buyer, and then cast a real vote. In the UK, for example,
> you can obtain a new ballot paper from a polling station official in
> exchange for a "spoiled" one. I believe Rebecca Mercuri has always
> suggested that a voter should be able to confirm whether a receipt
> printed by an electronic voting machine correctly records their intended
> vote, and if not to void it.
> 
I'd prefer that the printed receipt be retained at the polling station,
after the
voter has had an opportunity to examine it. This serves two purposes: First,
it prevents the vote selling described above, and second, if a recount is
required, it allows the recount to be done on the basis of a trustworthy 
record, already certified by the voter as accurate.

This loses some of the economic benefits of all-electronic systems, since
security still needs to be provided for the receipts for some period, but
is far less prone to invisible abuse.

Peter Trei
 

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