Session Fixation Vulnerability in Web Based Apps

Matthew Byng-Maddick cryptography at lists.colondot.net
Mon Jun 16 09:27:48 EDT 2003


On Mon, Jun 16, 2003 at 10:47:04AM +0100, Jill.Ramonsky at Aculab.com wrote:
> session id). Authentication of subesequent pages is assumed only if the
> client's IP address matches the IP address stored in the session variable
> corresponding to the client's session.
> Is this secure? If not, why not?

It's not a question of whether it's secure or not, in any kind of environment
with distributed proxies, it just plain won't work.

A more useful fix is to not allow arbitrary sessionids to be created, and
generate the state on login, and destroy it on logout. There may be a
condition I've missed with this, but I'm not sure.

MBM

-- 
Matthew Byng-Maddick         <mbm at colondot.net>           http://colondot.net/

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