A talk on Intellectual Property and National Defense

[Trei, Peter]

Dave:

Adam is correct - I was responding to him.

'secure remote attestation that the boot 
sequence was followed'

seems to imply that a net connection back 
to Hollywood would be required to boot.

'All your computer are belong to us'.

Peter Trei 

> ----------
> From: 	Adam Shostack[SMTP:adam at homeport.org]
> Sent: 	Tuesday, February 04, 2003 11:42 AM
> To: 	Dave Farber
> Cc: 	Trei, Peter; cryptography at wasabisystems.com
> Subject: 	Re: A talk on Intellectual Property and National Defense
> 
> Dave,
> 
> I think Peter was responding to me, not you.
> 
> And no, I'm not proposing that this be done, but I suspect that the
> RIAA and MPAA will go as far as saying no off-net viewing of
> controlled media.  Recall that they already supported the DIVX system
> which required a phone line to work.   From their perspective, its
> their content, and they're going to squeeze it as much from it as they
> can.
> 
> Adam
> 
> On Tue, Feb 04, 2003 at 11:37:20AM -0500, Dave Farber wrote:
> | Sorry that is not what I said. Where did you get that from the above?
> | 
> | On 2/4/03 11:28 AM, "Trei, Peter" <ptrei at rsasecurity.com> wrote:
> | 
> | >> Adam Shostack[SMTP:adam at homeport.org] writes:
> | >> 
> | >> I believe that DRM systems will require not just an authorized boot
> | >> sequence, but a secure remote attestation that that boot sequence was
> | >> followed, and a secure attestation as to the versions of the software
> | >> on your system.  So, while a secure system is needed for AT/DRM, its
> | >> not enough. 
> | >> 
> | > Let me get this straight - in order to make the RIAA and MPAA richer,
> | > we're going to ban off-net computer use? If you're not near a WiFi
> | > hotspot you won't be able to boot your laptop?
> | > 
> | > Peter Trei
> | > 
> | > 
> | > 
> | 
> 
> -- 
> "It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
> 					               -Hume
> 
> 

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