example: secure computing kernel needed

[Anne & Lynn Wheeler]

At 07:25 PM 12/11/2003 -0500, Paul A.S. Ward wrote:
 >I'm not sure why no one has considered the PC banking problem to be a
 >justification for secure computing.  Specifically, how does a user know
 >their computer has not been tampered with when they wish to use it for
 >banking access.

actually the EU FINREAD (financial reader) standard is quite directed at 
this area. basically a secure entry/display\token-interface device. part of 
the issue is not skimming any pin-entry that may be assumed as possible 
with just about all keyboard-based entry (aka tamper evident device .... 
supposedly somewhat consumer equivalent of the TSM ... trusted security 
module and tamper evident guidelines for point-of-sale terminals). In 
effect, finread is isolating some set of secure components into a tamper 
evident housing that has something akin to a trusted security module.

the other aspect somewhat shows up in the digital signature area. 
fundamentally a digital signature may be used for authenticating (and 
message integrity) ... but not, by itself as to "agreement" in the legal 
signature sense. the issue is how to create an environment/infrastructure 
for supporting both straight-forward authentication as well as 
intention/agreement

in theory finread has the ability to securely display the value of a 
transaction (and possibly other necessary details) and then requires a PIN 
entry after the display as evidence of

1) something you know authentication
2) being able to infer agreement with the transaction.

pretty much assumed is that finread implies some sort of token acceptor 
device ... which in turn implies a "something you have" token authentication.

so finread is attempting to both address two-factor authentication (and 
possibly three if biometric is also supported) as well as establish some 
environment related for inferring agreement/intention/etc as required per 
legal signature.

possibly overlooked in the base eu finread work is being able to prove that 
the transaction actually took place with a real finread device as opposed 
to some other kind of environment. In the (financial standard) X9A10 
working group on the X9.59 financial standard for all electronic retail 
payments we spent some amount of time on not precluding that the signing 
environment could also sign the transaction i.e.

1) amount displayed on secure secure display,
2) pin/biometric securely entered (after display occurs)
3) token digitally signs (after pin/biometric entered)
4) finread terminal digital signs

the 2nd & 3rd items (alone) are two (or three) factor authentication. 
however, in conjunction with the first and fourth items some level of 
assurance that the person agrees with the transaction.

lots of past finread references:
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay7.htm#3dsecure 3D Secure Vulnerabilities? 
Photo ID's and Payment Infrastructure
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#53 Authentication white paper
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#54 FINREAD was. Authentication 
white paper
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#55 FINREAD ... and as an aside
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aepay11.htm#56 FINREAD was. Authentication 
white paper
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm10.htm#keygen2 Welome to the Internet, 
here's your private key
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#4 AW: Digital signatures as proof
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#5 Meaning of Non-repudiation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#6 Meaning of Non-repudiation
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm11.htm#23 Proxy PKI. Was: IBM alternative 
to PKI?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm12.htm#24 Interests of online banks and 
their users [was Re: Cryptogram:  Palladium Only for DRM]
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm14.htm#35 The real problem that https has 
conspicuously failed to fix
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm15.htm#40 FAQ: e-Signatures and Payments
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm9.htm#carnivore Shades of FV's Nathaniel 
Borenstein: Carnivore's "Magic Lantern"
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#57 Q: Internet banking
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#60 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#61 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#62 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001g.html#64 PKI/Digital signature doesn't work
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#25 Net banking, is it safe???
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001i.html#26 No Trusted Viewer possible?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001k.html#0 Are client certificates really secure?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#6 Smart Card vs. Magnetic Strip Market
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2001m.html#9 Smart Card vs. Magnetic Strip Market
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#10 Opinion on smartcard security 
requested
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002c.html#21 Opinion on smartcard security 
requested
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#46 Security Issues of using Internet 
Banking
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002f.html#55 Security Issues of using Internet 
Banking
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002g.html#69 Digital signature
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002m.html#38 Convenient and secure eCommerce 
using POWF
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#13 Help! Good protocol for national 
ID card?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002n.html#26 Help! Good protocol for national 
ID card?
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2002o.html#67 smartcard+fingerprint
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#25 HELP, Vulnerability in Debit PIN 
Encryption security, possibly
http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/2003h.html#29 application of unique signature
--
Anne & Lynn Wheeler    http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/
Internet trivia 20th anv http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/rfcietff.htm
  

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