ANDOS-based secure voting system

[Sidney Markowitz]

Joel Takvorian wrote:

> how can we prevent a single person from voting multiple 
> times???

A clear summary of some voting protocols including the use of ANDOS for 
voting with one central facility can be found at

http://csci.mrs.umn.edu/twiki/view/CSci4554f02/SethMattPresentation

If you compare the protocol that uses ANDOS with the one that uses two 
central facilities and avoids the complications of ANDOS, it may become 
clear just what is the point of the identification number I which is 
distributed using ANDOS. That number is linked to the identity of the 
voter. The problem being addressed is how to allow someone to vote while 
preserving the anonymity of their vote, i.e., without recording their 
real-world ID with the vote. ANDOS allows a central facility to 
distribute unique ID numbers without knowing who gets what ID. The 
second protocol simplifies the problem by allowing one central facility 
to know who got what ID and the second facility to know the vote cast by 
each ID, but anonymity depends on trusting the two facilities not to 
collude.

Where this relates to your question is that nothing in the protocols has 
anything to do with the problem of physically identifying the voter and 
certifying that individual's right to vote. That is outside the 
cryptographic protocol. Step 1 of the ANDOS version is publishing a list 
of eligible voters. That implies that there are individual identities, 
that some are eligible to vote, and that they can be identified. In Step 
2 each voter submits an intention to vote. This step implies some way 
for each voter to authenticate as being one of the identities on the 
list. Whether it is through biometrics or fear of legal sanctions or 
naive trust of all the voters is up to the people setting up the voting 
procedures. It is only after the identity has been verified and an ID 
number assigned that the rest of the protocol comes into play to allow 
exactly one vote per ID and to preserve the privacy of the voter.

  -- sidney

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