traffix analysis

Steve Schear s.schear at
Wed Aug 27 22:54:10 EDT 2003

At 09:17 PM 8/27/2003 -0500, Anonymous wrote:
> > Then the opponent can put unlimited effort into
> > traffic analysis but won't get anything in return,
> > beyond the _a priori_ obvious fact that some pair
> > of subscribers *may* have communicated.
>This is not true, and in fact this result is one of the most important
>to have been obtained in the anonymity community in the past decade.  The
>impossibility of practical, strong, real-time anonymous communication has
>undoubtedly played a role in the lack of deployment of such systems.
>The attack consists of letting the attacker subvert (or become!) one of
>the communication endpoints.  This can be as simple as running a "sting"
>web site offering illegal material.

That's what is all about.


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