biometrics

[lynn.wheeler at firstdata.com]

again, the issue is cost/benefit trade-off.

The current implementation of pin/magstripe .... allows evesdropping &
other techniques to efficiently electronically collect everything need
across a potentially extremely large number of different accounts ....
sufficient to perform multiple fraudulent transactions against each one of
them.

In the card/biometric example sited .... the water glass example is a total
red herring. the card has to be first stolen in order to perform a
fraudulent transaction. The claim is that it is more difficult & expensive
to fake a biometric lifted off the card than it is to fake a pin written on
the card (aka it is much more likely a fingerprint of interest can be
lifted from the stolen card). This is much more of a exploit than the water
glass red herring .... so the counter is how to make it more difficult that
a fingerprint lifted from the card could result in a fraudulent
transaction.




                                                                                              
                              Sidney Markowitz                                                
                           <sidney at sidney.com>     To:      Cryptography Mailing List         
                                      Sent by:        <cryptography at wasabisystems.com>        
                    owner-cryptography at wasabis     cc:                                        
                                    ystems.com     Subject:      Re: biometrics               
                                                                                              
                                                                                              
                           01/28/2002 10:47 AM                                                
                                                                                              
                                                                                              




On Sun, 2002-01-27 at 14:07, lynn.wheeler at firstdata.com wrote:
> The issue then is that biometric represents a particularly
> difficult shared-secret that doesn't have to be memorized

Shared "secret"? People don't leave a copy of their PIN on every water
glass they use.

 -- sidney





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