DOS attack on WPA 802.11?

[David Wagner]

Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
>If I am right and WPA needlessly 
>introduces a significant denial of service vulnerability, then it 
>should be fixed. If I am wrong, no change is needed of course.

But TKIP (the part of WPA you're talking about) is only a
temporary measure, and will soon be replaced by AES-CCMP.

The question is not "Should we replace TKIP?", because the
answer to that is obvious: "Yes, we should, and we will".
Th question is: "Why bother working on a `fix' to WPA that
will likely never be deployed and that will be obsoleted
in a few years by the spread of AES-CCMP?".

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