Proving security protocols

[Don Davis]

> I have been trying to read about formally proving security
> protocols. ... I was wondering if anyone here has seen a
> comparison between these approaches to evaluate things like
> ease of use and effectiveness.

5 years ago, i saw meadows give an interesting talk,
comparing the various state-of-the-art verification
tools, with caveats about each one's blind spots, and
with some attention to how easy/hard it is to make
mistakes while using such tools.  i suspect that the
talk i saw was from this paper:

Catherine Meadows, "Formal Verification of Cryptographic
Protocols: A Survey," Advances in Cryptology - Asiacrypt
'94, LNSC 917, Springer-Verlag, 1995, pp. 133-150.
http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/publications/CHACS/1995/1995meadows-asiacrypt94.ps


       In this paper we give a survey of the state of the
       art in the application of formal methods to the
       analysis of cryptographic protocols. We attempt to
       outline some of the major threads of research in
       this area, and also to document some emerging trends.

a more recent meadows paper surveys open problems in
the field:

Meadows, Catherine, "Open Issues in Formal Methods for
Cryptographic Protocol Analysis,"  Proc DISCEX 2000,
IEEE Computer Society Press, pp. 237-250, January, 2000.
http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/publications/CHACS/2000/2000meadows-discex.ps

       The history of the application of formal methods
       to cryptographic protocol analysis spans nearly
       twenty years, and recently has been showing signs
       of new maturity and consolidation. A number of
       specialized tools have been developed, and others
       have effectively demonstrated that existing general-
       purpose tools can also be applied to these problems
       with good results.  However, with this better
       understanding of the field comes new problems that
       strain against the limits of the existing tools.
       In this paper we will outline some of these new
       problem areas, and describe what new research needs
       to be done to to meet the challenges posed.

i found these papers on her group's publications page:
http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/publications/CHACS/CRYPTOindex.html


					- don davis, boston








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