If we had key escrow, Scarfo wouldn't be a problem

Dennis Glatting dennis.glatting at software-munitions.com
Wed Aug 15 13:50:09 EDT 2001


On Wed, 15 Aug 2001, Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law wrote:

> I have to say I agree in a way.  It has always been my contention that
> by opposing key escrow, we open the door to more key logging.  And
> that's good, so long as 1) it's not a built in remote-activation
> 'feature' of software or hardware and 2) there's a warrant
> requirement.  This gets the balance as right as we're going to get it
> - cops won't fish more than they already do, the act leaves a serious
> paper trail, and judges are as involved as they want to be.
>

With key escrow they are free to log anyway, yes? If so, then all key
escrow adds is more information to collect.


> The argument that we should have no key escrow and also no means by
> which data is ever recoverable by legal means is unwinnable
> politically, and not necessarily right morally either.  The issue is
> whether there will be appropriate process and safeguards.
>

"Legal means," I'll argue, is a joke term. In the opinion and experience
of many, in the United States the ability to protect oneself against
inappropriate legal means is a direct function of one's financial
resources. For example, legal means can be interpreted as using the court
system to harass others, such as some companies are presently doing to
squash descent. The RIAA, MPAA, and others verses Felten, 2600, and others
is another.


> On Tue, 14 Aug 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:
>
> > The Washington Post finally catches on to the fact that the Scarfo case
> > exists, a few weeks after everyone else wrote about the hearing in Newark.
> > The front-page story today by Jonathan Krim contains this memorable passage:
> >
> > http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55606-2001Aug9.html
> > "Encryption is virtually unbreakable by police today, with programs that
> > can be bought for $15," said Stewart Baker, former general counsel of the
> > National Security Agency and now partner at the Washington law firm Steptoe
> > & Johnson. Although agreeing that surveillance should be done under strict
> > guidelines, Baker said that "to a degree, the privacy groups got us into
> > this by arguing that there should be no limits on encryption, and the
> > police have to deal with it."
> >
> > -Declan
> >
> >
> >
> >
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