If we had key escrow, Scarfo wouldn't be a problem

[Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law]

I have to say I agree in a way.  It has always been my contention that by
opposing key escrow, we open the door to more key logging.  And that's
good, so long as 1) it's not a built in remote-activation 'feature' of
software or hardware and 2) there's a warrant requirement.  This gets the
balance as right as we're going to get it - cops won't fish more than they
already do, the act leaves a serious paper trail, and judges are as
involved as they want to be.

The argument that we should have no key escrow and also no means by which
data is ever recoverable by legal means is unwinnable politically, and not
necessarily right morally either.  The issue is whether there will be
appropriate process and safeguards.

On Tue, 14 Aug 2001, Declan McCullagh wrote:

> The Washington Post finally catches on to the fact that the Scarfo case 
> exists, a few weeks after everyone else wrote about the hearing in Newark. 
> The front-page story today by Jonathan Krim contains this memorable passage:
> 
> http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55606-2001Aug9.html
> "Encryption is virtually unbreakable by police today, with programs that 
> can be bought for $15," said Stewart Baker, former general counsel of the 
> National Security Agency and now partner at the Washington law firm Steptoe 
> & Johnson. Although agreeing that surveillance should be done under strict 
> guidelines, Baker said that "to a degree, the privacy groups got us into 
> this by arguing that there should be no limits on encryption, and the 
> police have to deal with it."
> 
> -Declan
> 
> 
> 
> 
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