[Cryptography] Anti-clipper team re-assembles

[Ryan Carboni]

>
> >* This is all a smokescreen.
> *
> I am sorry you feel that way.  The risk that the government will do something bad that results in less global security is a very real one: they've done it before, they've tried to do it before, and they're clearly trying to do it again.  For examples, look at export ciphers, recent Wassenar, Clipper, software as a munition, etc.
>
> >* Passwords of insufficient entropy should be a larger concern.
> *
> It doesn't matter how good your password is, if HTTPS isn't really secure.
>
> I never thought that I would use the Satayana quote: those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. Damn, I'm old.
>
> 	/r$
> --
> Senior Architect, Akamai Technologies
> IM: richsalz at jabber.at <http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography> Twitter: RichSalz
>
>
https://cyber.law.harvard.edu/pubrelease/dont-panic/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf

I suppose it is alright for there to be disagreements over direction.
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