name: cryptskii path: /tmp Count for cryptskii: 2 cryptskii Subject Lines Subject: [Cryptography] handling the "Double Spend Problem" pure Subject: [ANN] DRAM-Based Dual-Binding Random Walk (DBRW): A Clone-Resistant Runtime Binding Primitive Subject: [Cryptography] handling the "Double Spend Problem" pure cryptskii Emails From cryptskii at proton.me Sun May 11 20:17:12 2025 From: cryptskii at proton.me (cryptskii at proton.me) Date: Mon, 12 May 2025 00:17:12 +0000 Subject: [Cryptography] handling the "Double Spend Problem" pure cryptography and math (no consensus) In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <5hbfO8mJlFJxwDyxnMuLVlNjsfmHhVKvd1_O8oZS7UAaR3PjSsCeUm-6z0ZNnXxvcrgmgVmBgrcOmtuFdoMc-WbuLm9mVCPEl36nKyAkvG8=@proton.me> Subject: [ANN] DRAM-Based Dual-Binding Random Walk (DBRW): A Clone-Resistant Runtime Binding Primitive ? DRAM-Based Dual-Binding Random Walk (DBRW) TL;DR: ? Hash-chain-driven random walks over DRAM ? unique timing fingerprint ? Extracts environment-bound features (path, inode, namespaces) ? Combines both via a one-way binding hash: H_bind = H(DRAM_walk_hash || env_params) ? Cannot be replayed, migrated, or spoofed ? Fully offline, quantum-safe, no enclave dependency Key Security Bounds: Cross-Device Forgery: P[success] <= 2^(-? * k) + negl(?) Same-Device Partition Attack: P[success] <= 2^(-? * j) + negl(?) Where: ? ? = entropy per DRAM timing measurement ? ? = entropy per environment factor ? k, j = number of samples ? ? = security parameter No TPM. No TEE. No bullshit. Just physics + math. Verification time: under 50ms False acceptance rate: ~10^-10 No network dependency Let me know if you want the full paper. ? Brandon ?Cryptskii? Ramsay May 2025 Sent with Proton Mail secure email. Sunday, April 13th, 2025 at 9:53 AM, cryptskii at proton.me wrote: > Greetings Punks, > > moderator, sir/madame I understand that this may not fit in with the political criteria, I just thought > that it may interest you simply because of what it solves, and the fact that some of the time solving this problem was spent in this mailing list for the original solution or what led to it anyway with bitcoin. If it doesn't, and you do not forward it I completely understand. > > My work primarily has been revolving around scaling the technology in a pure trustless manner. I've also been working on post quantum stuff for bitcoin. Stealth addresses introduced by Peter Todd, deterministic random walks as zero knowledge proofs, and a lot of experimenting with state channels, both bilateral and unilateral, as my concept of self validating state transitions, and balance variance embedded led to what I came up with in this paper, which is the "Decentralized State Machine". > > appreciate any in all feedback and it is a pleasure to make your acquaintances, > > https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/592 > > Cryptskii From cryptskii at proton.me Sun Apr 13 09:53:47 2025 From: cryptskii at proton.me (cryptskii at proton.me) Date: Sun, 13 Apr 2025 13:53:47 +0000 Subject: [Cryptography] handling the "Double Spend Problem" pure cryptography and math (no consensus) Message-ID: Greetings Punks, moderator, sir/madame I understand that this may not fit in with the political criteria, I just thought that it may interest you simply because of what it solves, and the fact that some of the time solving this problem was spent in this mailing list for the original solution or what led to it anyway with bitcoin. If it doesn't, and you do not forward it I completely understand.? My work primarily has been revolving around scaling the technology in a pure trustless manner. I've also been working on post quantum stuff for bitcoin. Stealth addresses introduced by Peter Todd, deterministic random walks as zero knowledge proofs, and a lot of experimenting with state channels, both bilateral and unilateral, as my concept of self validating state transitions, and balance variance embedded led to what I came up with in this paper, which is the "Decentralized State Machine".? appreciate any in all feedback and it is a pleasure to make your acquaintances, https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/592 Cryptskii