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<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 18/04/2025 15:42, Kent Borg wrote:<br>
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cite="mid:43afff40-e396-4b4c-a623-15108c8baf4b@borg.org">
<pre wrap="" class="moz-quote-pre">On 4/17/25 9:55 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
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<pre wrap="" class="moz-quote-pre">Bruce Schneier had a great quote around this at the time, something like "the
claim is that if we didn't have SSL [with all the PKI folderol], chaos would
result. Turn off SSL on your computer/server and watch the complete lack of
chaos that results".
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I also saw Schneier once say that there is no need for password bullet
characters because shoulder-surfing is no longer a big problem. Except
it is *because* of obscured password typing that shoulder-surfing is no
longer such a problem. Sure, if one login didn't obscure password typing
the world wouldn't end, but if all those bullets were turned to clear
text on every login it would *become* a problem. (He did correct
himself. He is human, but not an idiot.)</pre>
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<p>No, the world has changed. In the beginning, shoulder surfing was
a threat because we were all using shared computers - student
computer labs full of terminals, shops with windows machines, etc.
Now everyone has their own laptop more or less, and at least their
own phone, and they are not doing their login process in what is
effectively a public space.</p>
<p>Bear in mind also the economics of the attack. A shoulder surfer
today would have to be lucky to get the right person, the right
account, would have to make money off it, and would expose
themselves to capture. Whereas back in the day, all accounts were
good for something, it wasn't illegal, and student labs were just
fun for stealing accounts.</p>
<p>So yes, shoulder surfing is *possible* but it's no longer
probable because it's no longer economic. Practices change, and
infosec should change with the times, but somehow becomes
unequivocable lore passed down from father to son, master to
acolyte ...<br>
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cite="mid:43afff40-e396-4b4c-a623-15108c8baf4b@borg.org">
<pre wrap="" class="moz-quote-pre">I think the same is true of with MitM attacks. One server going without
SSL wouldn't be the end of the world either. But if all certificates
went away MitM attacks would *become* a problem. (And all those
fear-sold VPN products would finally have a reason.)</pre>
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<p>And, if all the certificate went away, just exactly how would
that become a problem? Where in the chain of things would the
dreaded bogeyman MITM lurk waiting to pounce?</p>
<p>Again, the economics: an MITM can successfully crack one account.
These days, no attacker gets out of bed unless there are 6 figures
or it's a targetted attack in which case no cert will protect the
victim...<br>
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cite="mid:43afff40-e396-4b4c-a623-15108c8baf4b@borg.org">
<pre wrap="" class="moz-quote-pre">The rickety certificate system does accomplish something, even if it
isn't the best way to do so.</pre>
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<p>That's what we're saying :) it isn't the best way, and it does
something: it blocks all the better ways that help the vast
majority of people from the ordinary threats.<br>
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cite="mid:43afff40-e396-4b4c-a623-15108c8baf4b@borg.org">
<pre wrap="" class="moz-quote-pre">-kb, the Kent who has this image in his head of certificate renewals
spinning faster and faster until the system destroys itself, a bit like
Iranian centrifuges spinning themselves to destruction, but in this case
naïvely self-inflicted and not because of something malicious, a la Stuxnet.
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<p>Yeah, there's this inductive discussion of why 47 days. If that's
good, then 23 days better. And 11 days even better. Why not every
minute?</p>
<p>If you ask this question of the certificate industrial complex
warriors, you can sense them putting on their twister uniforms
behind the curtain.<br>
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cite="mid:43afff40-e396-4b4c-a623-15108c8baf4b@borg.org">
<pre wrap="" class="moz-quote-pre">P.S. No, I do not think Let's Encrypt will turn the expiration times
down to a vanishingly small value. I think they will turn them down to
some small value that they can sustain, and stop at that. That is, they
will stop at a value they can sustain until there is a bump in the road,
so to speak, and *then* the whole system flies apart in a spectacular
way. At that point it doesn't have to be a DDoS attack, just that
something goes wrong. And there is no way to keep things from going
wrong. But there are ways to design systems so they are brittle or so
that they are supple--whether they fail big or fail little--when things
*do* go wrong.
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