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Hello Team,</div>
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We recently filed a patent on 'Renewable Identities - Dynamic PII'.</div>
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The novelty offered by this (patent pending) technique relates to safeguarding PII by offering Dynamic Personally Identifiable Information (DPII) which completely eliminates static PII & cannot be compromised by means of :</div>
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a) Card skimming & social engineering fraud</div>
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b) Phishing, vishing, smishing</div>
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c) Pharming & Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)</div>
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d) Photo copy fraud & replay attack</div>
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e) Insider fraud and Database breach, etc.</div>
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The PPT (converted to PDF) is available <a href="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/9gxoxdmyk40x4pf56l712/Renewable_Identities_OTPI_OTCI_NB_2024_PPT_v2.3.pdf?rlkey=so2tqngnf85jang2lpzyqmstx&dl=0" id="OWAf0638e25-f726-1098-7892-fbeea36e7bb3" class="OWAAutoLink" title="https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/9gxoxdmyk40x4pf56l712/Renewable_Identities_OTPI_OTCI_NB_2024_PPT_v2.3.pdf?rlkey=so2tqngnf85jang2lpzyqmstx&dl=0">
here</a></div>
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This has links to a more detailed datasheet and even more detailed whitepaper.</div>
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The core concept relies on symmetric crypto. Ancillary components will leverage asymmetric crypto and PKI.</div>
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Would appreciate feedback on the concept and, most importantly, if someone can punch a hole in the threat mitigation 🙂</div>
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<p class="elementToProof" style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">Looking forward to hearing from you...</span></p>
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<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">Regards</span></p>
<p style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px;"><span style="font-family: Calibri, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);">Govind</span></p>
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<div id="x_divRplyFwdMsg" dir="ltr"><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt; color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"><b>From:</b> cryptography <cryptography-bounces+yadavgovind=hotmail.com@metzdowd.com> on behalf of cryptography-request@metzdowd.com <cryptography-request@metzdowd.com><br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, May 15, 2024 5:00 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> cryptography@metzdowd.com <cryptography@metzdowd.com><br>
<b>Subject:</b> cryptography Digest, Vol 133, Issue 5</span>
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Today's Topics:<br>
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1. Re: Wring isn't as secure on big messages as I thought<br>
(Pierre Abbat)<br>
<br>
<br>
----------------------------------------------------------------------<br>
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Message: 1<br>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 06:25:38 -0400<br>
From: Pierre Abbat <phma@bezitopo.org><br>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com<br>
Subject: Re: [Cryptography] Wring isn't as secure on big messages as I<br>
thought<br>
Message-ID: <6771489.XQYqjrCR6X@puma><br>
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"<br>
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On Friday, May 10, 2024 4:16:23 PM EDT Pierre Abbat wrote:<br>
> Can you think of a better mix3parts pattern, or should I simply increase the<br>
> number of rounds?<br>
<br>
The mix3parts pattern, with the number near len/? (len is 1/3 of the message<br>
size) that's of maximal order (a primitive root of len, if there are any), is<br>
not the problem. I ran a simulation of enciphering a megabyte, assuming that<br>
mix3 results in any byte affecting all three. With all rotations being by<br>
integral numbers of bytes, the number of affected bytes grew as 1, 3, 9, 27,<br>
27, 81, 243, 729, 2187, 6546. At this point there were collisions of the<br>
affected bytes. With rotations being by any number of bits, the growth factor<br>
was between 4.42 and 4.72.<br>
<br>
I think the slow growth is due to two factors:<br>
<br>
1. When the rotation is by 8n?1, a changed byte affects one byte most of the<br>
time, and a single bit of another byte half the time.<br>
<br>
2. When three bytes are mixed, a single bit change in one byte either affects<br>
that byte or affects the other two bytes, but not both.<br>
<br>
I'm going to increase the number of rounds.<br>
<br>
Pierre<br>
--<br>
li fi'u vu'u fi'u fi'u du li pa<br>
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