<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<body>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">I only sort of follow your proposal for
formalism, but I do like the idea that we might pull some of this
messy external stuff into a well defined and tidy world where it
could be cleaned up. But it will only get us so far, I think it is
an uphill battle to pull more in.<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">I think cryptography is a victim of its
own success. The "easy" (as in well defined) problems have been
solved. Such as good symmetrical encryption, key exchange, public
key encryption, quality hashing, etc. These are big wins, I
remember times before all of those examples, when the public had
no access to good cryptography and everything was in the clear or
nearly so.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">That big glaring problem has largely
been solved, except cases when we just forget and don't even <i>try</i>
to secure data, sensitive and even boring data is encrypted pretty
well these days. The next problems had a larger radius, such as
the importance of encryption modes, and as the radius gets still
larger to system issues, such as knowing what databases are in the
system, whether RNG is even hooked up, how easily will users be
tricked into giving over their access to con-men, etc., and
cryptography has little to offer.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">The above "we just forget" is the
point.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">The encryption algorithm isn't attacked
anymore, not when it is so good, now that there are so many easier
targets. Heck, even memory safety attacks are only ever used
against a few fairly hard targets such as ios or Chrome, because
there are so many easier ways, with ever more being installed
constantly.</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">If your proposed formalism can create
new well defined problems that are useful to solve, cryptography
may live a bit longer. But it looks to me that cryptography is
running low on problems to solve. Right?<br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">-kb<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><br>
</div>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">P.S. On 3/19/24 04:55, Jerrold Leichter
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:D80871D9-8CEE-4FE8-B19C-D937F79929E5@lrw.com">
<pre class="moz-quote-pre" wrap="">[…] I note in particular Kent Boyd’s comment about […]</pre>
</blockquote>
<p> Correction: the name is Borg, as in "Björn" or "The" or a stupid
way to drink too much too fast; not Boyd as in something
different.</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><br>
</p>
<p><font size="2">Jerry: This is edited from an earlier version you
got but that I canceled before it got moderated.<br>
</font></p>
<br>
</body>
</html>