<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
</head>
<body>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 7/15/21 4:41 PM, Phillip
Hallam-Baker wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CAMm+LwhoPVTWrJ0Fe_uztD+NaASMJhrhxui8hex=UCTAYDAXRQ@mail.gmail.com">
<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=UTF-8">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_quote"><br>
<div>Developing a new cryptographic elections scheme (and a
proof) might get you tenure but it almost certainly won't
get used. I am one of the very few people trying to get
people interested in using threshold schemes and it is an
uphill struggle which I would not be able to do in either
academia or in any but the very largest industrial
research labs. </div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
</blockquote>
<br>
I am interested in this. (cryptographic elections via
threshold mechanisms)<br>
<br>
Although I doubt it's going to be applicable to political
elections in our lifetime. We still have trouble securing computers
well enough, on a large enough scale, and at least in some cases in
the hands of election officials who don't care much about security
or may even actively assist in subverting it if they have the
opportunity. No matter how good a computer implementation is, it has
to be running on a machine that isn't rooted. <br>
<br>
Paper lacks the CPU power and read/write memory necessary to run
malware, and paper is simple enough for people to understand, so we
need paper ballots.<br>
<br>
Bear<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
</body>
</html>