<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><div><blockquote type="cite" class=""><span style="font-family: Calibri, sans-serif; font-size: 11pt;" class="">Can anyone point me to any papers dealing with the issue of whether Shamir’s Secret Sharing scheme is quantum crypto resistant. In particular if it is resistant does the resistance improve if the complexity of the scheme increases. That is, with n out of t, is 2 out of 3 keys less resistant that say 11 out of 21?</span><br class=""><div class=""><div class="WordSection1" style="page: WordSection1; caret-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: Courier; font-size: 14px; font-style: normal; font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: normal; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px; text-decoration: none;"><div style="margin: 0cm 0cm 0.0001pt; font-size: 11pt; font-family: Calibri, sans-serif;" class=""><o:p class=""></o:p></div></div></div></blockquote></div><font face="Times New Roman" class=""><span style="font-style: normal;" class="">Shamir Secret Sharing is information-theoretically secure: For n total shares required, given n-1 of the shares, for any possible secret, there is a unique n'th share that produces exactly that secret. That is, knowing n-1 shares gives you no information at all about the secret. Quantum computation doesn't help in recovering what isn't there to begin with. There's no difference in "resistance" regardless of n and t.</span></font><div class=""><font face="Times New Roman" class=""><span style="font-style: normal;" class=""><br class=""></span></font></div><div class=""><font face="Times New Roman" class=""><span style="font-style: normal;" class=""><div class=""> -- Jerry</div><div class=""><br class=""></div></span></font></div></body></html>