[Cryptography] NSA voting on TLS encryption at the IETF TLS WG

[Salz, Rich]

Andrew’s post requires some corrections.

The draft does not “bury” anything in the IANA considerations. That section appears near the end of the RFC, just as all such sections do. In this case it appears on page six of a 10-page document of which three pages are references and at least another two are boilerplate (copyright, table of contents, etc.)

The list of “arguments” is a biased subset. For example, the cost of switching from hybrid to pure-PQ is ignored.

Dan’s moderation — the third, I think — is because he will not participate in the rules of engagement for IETF email lists[1]. He repeatedly refuses. I sent email to Andrew about this days ago. Dan is not being gagged, any more than a kid on the playground who bullies can expect to always get away with it.

The phrase “this is actually the third vote” is incorrect. The IETF works on “rough consensus and running code” and has for more than 30 years. It’s not a vote.  If dozens of people join in July and post that they are opposed, the Working Group chairs, who determine consensus, are free to ignore their messages as they have not been WG participants.

Andrew’s appeal was filed, and he received notice that it was received, not​ that it was accepted. I expect that the IESG, when they consider the moderation circumstances, will reject it.

Finally, I’ve known Mike Jenkins for many years. He comes to the IETF meetings. We chat. I think he’s spoken at the mic line, but I’m not positive. The fact that he wrote his first email to support a draft should be taken more as an indication that Dan and his acolytes have poisoned the debate.


[1] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/statement-iesg-statement-on-clarifying-derivative-works-rights/

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