[Cryptography] Magnetic media destruction question
Jan Dušátko
jan at dusatko.org
Thu Jan 8 04:28:59 EST 2026
Dne 08. 01. 26 v 4:17 Peter Gutmann via cryptography napsal(a):
> Yup, it's pretty much completely irrelevant. One is a collection of clearly-
> labelled/identified bits of paper with the labelling visible to the naked eye,
> the other is a mini-skip full of, let's say ten million because I'm too lazy
> to sit down and do the volumetric calculation, identical fragments that have
> all suffered severe mechanical trauma. And it's not like when I looked at it
> 30+ years ago where you could use ferrofluid to get an idea of the geometry
> and then try and recover the MFM data signal with an MFM (magnetic force
> microscope) and a lot of effort, you're dealing with exotic recording
> technologies where, and this is the bit I'm not sure about, you may need to
> actually physically reconstruct the platter to be able to pull a signal off
> it, or at least recover the encoding for the signal. The bit density on a
> fragment won't matter much if the only way to recover what's on there is to
> have it moving under a read head at a given velocity with a flying height of a
> few nanometers... on a shredded fragment with burrs and bends and other
> damage.
>
> Peter.
> _______________________________________________
Peter,
In past I need to digging deeper in that area, because I have
participated in several discussions on this topic with customers. They
have concerned both magnetic media and solid state drives. The
discussion is challenging but interesting because it balances data
protection, sometimes cryptography, physics, technology and engineering
disciplines. I would like to summarize few points, may could be useful
for someone, beside there are lack of relation to cryptography.
Hard Drive:
Hard drive are fantastic engineering masterpiece. Could be provided with
rotation per minute from list of 5400,7200,10000,15000. Able to read up
to four segments per rotation (depends on optimalization). Able to
precisely move fast enough to relevant track with time shorter than half
of one rotation. And read extremely small bit of data. That bit now
contain few magnetic domains (sometimes tenths, sometime only few of
them) and depends on technology has a size about 100nm in length and
50nm wide. I do not know exact properties from SMR devices (Shingled
Magnetic Recording). This can create a problem how to recover data.
Methods used in past could be summarized as:
- Mount plates to another disk and read pieces of data. This is natural
attitude with low probability of success. Without reprogramming of
controller to read raw data is unrealistic. More, the head itself is too
wide to get appropriate "remnants". Pieces of data could be read thanks
to imperfection of technology, like small vibration of head, not quite
accurate exposure of the header to the same position as in the previous
read/write case, wrong behave of domains on the threshold of magnetic
field enforcing bit to change and other deviations.
- Kerr effect - tilting of plane polarized light. For infrared light
this is about 5°, the higher the frequency, the lower the angle. More,
you need to use magnetic domain size bigger than wavelength. That kind
of attitude is relevant for past technology.
- Magnetic force microscopy (MFM). That technology require mostly two
pass, where first one mapping relief (AFM) thanks to Wan der Walls
forces, second path is about collecting information from distance (in
nanometers scale) by magnetic force. That kind of mapping require vacuum
and it is slow. But able to read orientation of magnetic domains ...
include gaps between.
- In situation of shreeding, cutting material to pieces eradicate piece
of data in the mechanical stress zone due to mechanical stress and
possible reorganization due to indentation into the material.
Furthermore, shearing or removal of material thermally and mechanically
stresses individual domains, in addition to reorganization, some may
pass the Curie temperature and lose the ability to hold information. The
information from them is then random, mostly follow closest field force
(could be engines or earth magnetic field).
- In situation of burning, crossing the Curie temperature has the same
properties, domains stay randomly oriented.
- Demagnetizing of media, exactly enforcing media to use specific or
random orientation probably will be tough to achieve for technologies
like HAMR or MAMR.
Technology;Size of bit;Domains per bit;Size of domain;Curie point
LMR;200-100nm;10-50;200-80nm;720-870K
PMR;100-20nm;5-20;20-10nm;720-920K
SMR;80-15nm;5-15;15-10nm;720-920K
HAMR;50-5nm;2-8;8-5nm;970-1020K
MAMR;60-7nm;3-10;10-7nm;770–920 K
This is a reason, why I enforcing disk encryption, mainly on disk level
to save a computation power. I do not think so that I need to explain
advantages, because erasing of key material will be enough (for
paranoid, you can reprovision the new key and overwrite whole content,
delete that key again after).
For regular disk wipe, there are quite good list of standards. Peter
Gutman introduced me to this area 20 years ago, but he is not aware
about (thanks Peter, I was curios about your reasons for 35 pass). From
my perspective, 3 phases is enough for most situation, 7 for sensitive
data. But any remnants on the edge, caused by random head moving
(vibration, temperature) can achieve attacker to read that data. Mainly
pieces of data, broken by another write operations. Something you would
like to read 10 letters writen on the same paper by the same pencil.
Standards in that area is bellow.
NIST SP 800-88 (Rev. 1)
DoD 5220.22-M
DoD 5220.22-M ECE
Air Force (AFSSI 5020)
German BSI (BSI-2011-VS)
Peter Gutmann Method
Cryptographic Erasure (Crypto Erase)
IEEE 2883-2022
Solid State Drive:
This is probably most funny part. Solid state disks are memories, which,
depends of technology (and architecture), could have complete different
behave. And because small, could end in funny stories about mechanical
destruction, which destruct case, but not media inside.
SSD disk should not use wipping like HDD, because of statistical
properties of balancing utilization. Security should depend on
cryptography, nothing else.
I hope this can help to someone. And, please apologize me for my gramma,
I still work on it.
Regards
Jan
--
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Jan Dušátko
Tracker number: +420 602 427 840
e-mail:jan at dusatko.org
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