[Cryptography] New White Paper: GhostLine - Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Party Chat

[Dennis Hamilton]

-----Original Message-----
From: Patrick Chkoreff
Sent: Saturday, January 3, 2026 14:45
To: cryptography at metzdowd.com
Subject: Re: [Cryptography] New White Paper: GhostLine - Information-Theoretically Secure Multi-Party Chat

On 1/2/26 3:01 PM, Ray Dillinger wrote:

> The thing you missed is that knowing any one of the 256 bit blocks in 
> the OTP sequence is terrifyingly easy and can be done by passive 
> eavesdropping.

To recap, I had previously described a way to generate a pseudo-random OTP versus a truly-random OTP.

I was of course assuming that the OTP would never be reused, not even one block -- EVER.  That's the primary rule of using an OTP.  In that ideal perfect case, there cannot be a known-plaintext attack.

[orcmid] --- Response --

When I saw the remark by Ray Dillinger, I presumed he was talking about a known-plaintext attack and that successfully catching the encryption of *one* known block would reveal the continuation of the proposed (deterministic?) OTP over the rest of the cipher-text.  It has noting to do with reusing the OTP, but discovering its deterministic generation.

Is that not the fragility being pointed to here?

 - Dennis