[Cryptography] OTP USB TLA
Sampo Syreeni
decoy at iki.fi
Mon Sep 22 19:56:15 EDT 2025
On 2025-09-22, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> I think that there are real-world protocols that do that. Or see §5 of
> https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb/papers/netmeas.pdf from 1992.
Yours is about the same reasoning I'm talking about, yes, but it hasn't
been implemented in the wild, and certainly not as in an acute fashion
as what I'm talking about.
Your paper uses network delay as the lower bound in a temporally bound
protocol and its suggested proof-of-correctness. What I'm suggesting is
that in certain situations we should and *could*, using current radio
technology, approach the ultimate relativistic time-of-light bound,
instead of an abstract network one. I'm thinking about how you might
approach *that* bound, and then by so doing actually *guarantee*
something in security which is founded in physics. Not in *a* time of
flight bound, but *the* one.
I'd argue that with current electronics, this can be done to a rather
high degree. But not to a perfect or immediately obvious degree. The
calculation is still involved, especially in NFC-like systems. They work
in the resonant, non-radiative, coupled, near field, so that the idea of
an invariant speed of light does not really fit. The group velocity,
which governs the rate of information transfer, is in general much
slower in these kinds of systems than is its straight phase velocity
counterpart which coincides with it in the far field. And the field
kicks back quite differently between the two near "antennas" (not really
those, because we're working the near field and not the radiative outer
one, so that e.g. the magnetic field decays as 1/r^3)). There are all
*kinds* of band limitation and even noise issues to contend with here,
before we're really done with the analysis, and know how bilateral
communication in the near feal should even be like; what it can and
cannot do. How it should translate into the extant nonlinear/amplifying
elements in circuit design.
What I'm thinking about here is not the high level architecture you
referred to in your early paper, but the nitty-gritty, the minutiae of
how you implement a bilateral privacy amplification protocol at the
level of nanoseconds, using actual transistors (?). So that you could
actually approach the flight-of-light final bound in a provable,
physically implemented fashion.
(Steven et al, I grew up reading your work. I cannot readily discern
what I thought of from what you and others fed me, via literature. But
here, you clearly do not think about radio technology and circuit
design like I do.)
--
Sampo Syreeni, aka decoy - decoy at iki.fi, http://decoy.iki.fi/front
+358-40-3648785, 025E D175 ABE5 027C 9494 EEB0 E090 8BA9 0509 85C2
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