[Cryptography] Factoring safe semiprimes

[Peter Gutmann]

Stephan Neuhaus <neut at zhaw.ch> writes:

>As I read their result, it meant that in the presence of noise (i.e.,
>always), Shor's Algorithm will "almost certainly fail" for large semiprimes,
>but all that means is that one needs ever greater numbers of qubits for error
>correction.

As an aside, I think we need to create a new term alongside "squarefree
semiprimes" to denote semiprimes that aren't close to being squares for
sleight-of-hand purposes.

Also, how well known is the term semiprime?  I suspect if you waved it at
someone who understands crypto in general without being a hardcore
mathematician you may get a blank look.

Peter.