[Cryptography] Has quantum cryptanalysis actually achieved anything?
Bill Stewart
billstewart at pobox.com
Wed Mar 12 02:07:30 EDT 2025
On 3/11/2025 6:50 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 11, 2025 at 04:58:39PM -0400, Jerry Leichter wrote:
>
>> Block ciphers like AES - and symmetric cryptography in general - are
>> not particularly vulnerable to quantum computer attacks. (The best
>> attack known on such algorithms use Grover's algorithm, which turns
>> brute force search from O(N) to O(SQRT(N)), where N would be 2^n for
>> an n-bit key. So it reduces your security level by 1 bit.)
>
> Actually, it halves the number of bits: sqrt(2^n) = 2^{n/2}. So, in
> theory, a 256-bit key would be brute-forced in 2^{128} time, and a
> 128-bit key in 2^{64} time. Whether this ever works in practice remains
> to be seen.
Also, that's 2^{n/2} steps, but quantum computer steps may end up being
a lot slower than conventional CPU steps, so there's a few tens of bits
of extra padding left even in that 128-bit key.
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