[Cryptography] Keeping Malware from Using Security Hardware
Kent Borg
kentborg at borg.org
Wed Mar 5 18:35:29 EST 2025
On 3/5/25 12:15 AM, Kent Borg wrote:
> 5. The UI. How the hell can that be made meaningful enough to offer
> any security yet flexible enough to be of general use?
I get behind in my podcast listening, but just now I was listening to
Risky Biz #781
(https://pca.st/episode/b95a109c-667d-48dc-844a-8a64ef8b00f3) and their
first story is North Koreans stealing US$1.4 billion from Bybit. (Byebit?)
Bybit uses Ledger hardware wallets, with a display. This transaction
needed to be approved by humans. And they signed off! Sounds like it
happened thus:
- Planting in advance an evil "smart" contract on some blockchain, and
it directed proceeds to North Korea.
- Using what sounds like an amendment provision in the legit "smart"
contract to get the evil contract also run as part of executing that
naïve dupe contract.
- Because Bybit's systems were designed with security (!) in mind, this
transaction needed to have the "signature" approval of multiple persons.
But the hardware wallet doesn't understand their multiple approval
stuff, so what was presented on the hardware wallets was a series of API
calls complete with parameters, and it sounds like lots of hex.
- Once the North Koreans broke into the Bybit network they did their
homework, figured out internal procedures and who was whom at Bybit, and
they targeted the computers of those who needed to approve the
transaction with malware (a Chrome extension?, muses the podcast) and
this malware presented (lying) transaction details in a comprehensible
form. How handy, much easier to read than the stuff the scrolls off
hardware wallet screen.
*POOF*
$1.4 billion, gone.
It seems that this hardware wallet should have an advantage over
"Nebuchadnezzar" in being even more single-purpose. But they left in a
low-level general-purpose feature (showing API calls) whose only excuse
for being there would have been as a development feature, instead of the
more complete sounding approach of Nebuchadnezzar.
And, I suppose the other advantage that the North Koreans had is the one
they have been exploiting for years now: The crypto bros are so blinded
by how cool they think their blockchains are, and are also part of the
move-fast we'll debug it in production ethic, that they build insecure
systems. A architecture where boo-boos can't be clawed back, by design.
(It is all almost like some violent Warner Bros cartoon where the party
that got bonked on the head last time will get bonked on the again head
this time, and again in an entertaining way.)
Very interesting problems.
-kb
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