[Cryptography] Against against DNS (Re: New SSL/TLS certs to each live no longer than 47) days by 2029

[Stephen Farrell]

Hiya,

On 25/04/2025 18:29, David Conrad via cryptography wrote:
> DNSSEC+DANE can solve essentially the same problem as TLS but in an
> arguably more secure way that few people understand or care about
> (i.e., a single trust anchor vs. a forrest with transitive trust).
> End users aren’t going to demand this and historically, browser
> vendors argued the additional lookups DNSSEC+DANE implied had a
> negative impact on web page viewing times, so they had no interest
> in adding the code to support DNSSEC+DANE. 

That's not quite, but almost, correct IIUC.

Chromium had DANE code for a while, but they took it out, and I
think browser makers more complained of reliability issues with
getting DNSSEC-signed answers (in a few percent of cases, due to
dodgy middleboxen) rather than added-latency.

> Any increased security
> represented by the different trust model was never considered
> important enough by the browser vendors (for whatever reason) to
> outweigh the costs of deployment and the other use cases for the
> security represented by TLS/DNSSEC+DANE fall into the noise.

I like DANE, it'd be a fine thing. But it's not really credible as
an alternative to the WebPKI so long as we're at ~4% of 2LD zones
being signed. Given that's 15 years after the root zone was signed,
I'm not sure there's so much hope for DNSSEC, which is a pity.

Cheers,
S.

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