[Cryptography] New SSL/TLS certs to each live no longer than 47 days by 2029

[Christian de Larrinaga]

Peter Gutmann <pgut001 at cs.auckland.ac.nz> writes:

> John Levine <johnl at iecc.com> writes:
>
>>I don't understand this objection. I have LE certificates which LE resigns
>>every 90 days. When it does that, the certificate's key doesn't change, only
>>the time stamp.
>
> The argument for doing this is that it limits the time available to an
> attacker for key compromise.  If you're just re-signing the same key year in,
> year out then it's defeating the very thing that the constant-churn is
> supposedly good for.
>
> Peter.


Which suggests the architecture is itself introducing, even perpetuating
risk. 

If a key is compromised it is compromised now. I don't see how waiting
an hour let alone a few days is protective given the nano second trading
frequencies out there.

At best this is a sop or to be kinder "risk mitigation" but it is not a
solution to the stated problem. 


Kent has made an important point about honesty.


-- 
Christian de Larrinaga